ToolTrust
B17/100
burugo

one-mcp

mcp1.0.7

@burugo

A centralized reverse-proxy platform for MCP servers — manage, group, and export as Skills from a single endpoint.

By burugo | 67 findings | Scanned 6/15/2026 | tooltrust-scanner/v0.3.17 | 396

1 High15 Low51 Info

Risk Summary

Safe With Normal Controls

Dep Visibility is the main signal, but overall risk remains within an acceptable range.

Potential impact: This finding indicates the tool should be reviewed before it is trusted.

Recommended action: No high-risk findings were detected in this scan, but you should still apply least-privilege defaults and rescan after changes.

Suggested policy: keep this tool behind manual approval, do not allow unattended runs, and re-scan after narrowing risky permissions.

Security Findings (67)

  • HighAS-003

    🔀Scope Mismatch

    get_user_identity_by_subscription:tool name "get_user_identity_by_subscription" implies read-only operation but declares exec permission

    Fix: Ensure tool names, descriptions, and permission declarations are internally consistent. Use explicit naming conventions that fully reflect actual capabilities.

  • LowAS-011

    ℹ️Missing Rate-Limit / Timeout ×13

    tool performs network or execution operations but declares no rate-limit, timeout, or retry configuration

    create_alias_by_subscriptioncreate_subscriptioncreate_templatecreate_userget_user_identity_by_subscriptiononesignal_reference_overviewsend_messagestart_live_activitytransfer_subscriptionunsubscribe_emailupdate_subscriptionupdate_subscription_by_tokenupdate_template

    Fix: Declare explicit rate-limit, timeout, and retry configuration for all network and execution tools. Implement exponential back-off and surface resource state to the calling agent.

  • LowAS-002

    ⚠️Excessive Permissions ×2

    input schema exposes 33 properties (threshold: 10)

    send_message

    input schema exposes 18 properties (threshold: 10)

    start_live_activity

    Fix: Tool requests broad permissions (exec/fs/network). Validate input parameters using Enums where possible, and restrict file system operations to explicit allowed directories.

  • InfoAS-002

    ⚠️Excessive Permissions ×18

    declared capabilities: code/command execution, filesystem access

    create_alias_by_subscriptioncreate_subscriptioncreate_userupdate_subscriptionupdate_subscription_by_token

    declared capabilities: filesystem access

    create_or_update_aliascreate_segmentupdate_live_activityupdate_segmentupdate_user

    declared capabilities: filesystem access, HTTP requests

    create_templateupdate_template

    declared capabilities: code/command execution

    get_user_identity_by_subscriptionstart_live_activitytransfer_subscription

    declared capabilities: HTTP requests

    onesignal_reference_overviewunsubscribe_email

    declared capabilities: code/command execution, network access, HTTP requests

    send_message

    Fix: Tool requests broad permissions (exec/fs/network). Validate input parameters using Enums where possible, and restrict file system operations to explicit allowed directories.

  • InfoAS-014

    ℹ️Dependency Inventory Unavailable ×31

    Tool did not expose metadata.dependencies or repo_url, so supply-chain coverage is limited.

    create_alias_by_subscriptioncreate_or_update_aliascreate_segmentcreate_subscriptioncreate_templatecreate_userexport_audience_activity_csvexport_subscriptions_csvget_segmentget_templateget_user_identityget_user_identity_by_subscriptionlist_messageslist_segmentslist_templatesonesignal_configonesignal_healthonesignal_reference_overviewsend_messagestart_live_activitytransfer_subscriptionunsubscribe_emailupdate_live_activityupdate_segmentupdate_subscriptionupdate_subscription_by_tokenupdate_templateupdate_userview_messageview_outcomesview_user

    Fix: Review and remediate the identified issue.

  • InfoAS-010

    🔑Insecure Secret Handling ×2

    input parameter "token" accepts a credential (informational; not evidence of insecure handling)

    unsubscribe_emailupdate_subscription_by_token

    Fix: Avoid accepting raw credentials as input parameters. Use secret managers (e.g. 1Password CLI, AWS Secrets Manager) and ensure credentials are never logged or stored in agent traces.

Scan this tool yourself

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$ curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/main/install.sh | bash
$ tooltrust-scanner scan --server "npx -y one-mcp"

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